

3 June 1982

[redacted]

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I don't think that your review comes to grips with the leading of the three "distinct impressions" that you catalogue at the outset, i.e., political pressure on intelligence. This is important because, contrary to what I think you seem to be suggesting in the middle of p. 7, intelligence does matter, that it does make a difference; if not for "shaping" US forces, certainly for a range of what are likely to be much more consequential policies going to the core of the US-Soviet relationship. For example: Should we have START? Should we deal with them at all? Will they "win" the war if they start it? Should we be afraid to do X because the Russians may not like it and they have all that stuff that can hurt? Can NATO be saved if the view of the Russians changes toward more benign, less-threatening projections? I commend to you [redacted] article mentioned in my old letter (attached).

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Tony

P.S. The argument/explanation, bottom, p.3, is weak. In any case, does the "early change" predate the results of the A/B Team experience--if so, this could be made clearer.